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The public domain is all the rage.1  It is invoked to breach copyright’s 
encroaching enclosure of what one might grandiloquently call the cultural commons of 
the mind.  The heralds of our “remix culture”2 deploy the public domain to smash that 
icon of the entertainment-industrial complex, the Romantic Author.  But even before the 
Author became Romantic, he still served as a shill for concentrated industry, then the 
printing-bookselling complex.3  Authors’ moral claims of laborious entitlement merely 
masked the power grab of the printers.  If we speak of a grab, we imply that copyright 
was seized from somewhere.  So whence, in this account, was copyright wrested?  From 
the public domain. 
 
It is not my purpose here to take issue with the expanding normative role for the 
public domain.  I do not for a moment dispute that the public domain is today and should 
remain copyright’s constraining counterpart.  In its composition, my idea of the public 
                                                 
* Morton L Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University School of Law.  
Many thanks for research assistance to Matthew Batters, Columbia Law School class of 2006, without 
whom this project could not have been completed, and to Caleb Edwards, Columbia Law School class of 
2008 and Christina Jodidio, University of Paris II class of 2007.  Thanks also to Clarisa Long, Henry 
Monaghan, Thomas Nachbar, William R. Cornish, Lionel Bently, and especially Anne Barron. 
1 The volume of academic writing on the public domain has vastly increased since the signal articles of 
David Lange, “Recognizing the Public Domain”, (1981) 44 Law & Contemp. Probs. 147  and of Jessica 
Litman, “The Public Domain”, (1990) 39 Emory L.J. 965.  See, e.g., Bernt Hugenholtz and Lucie Guibault, 
The Future of the Public Domain (forthcoming 2006) (collection of essays on the public domain from 
multiple contributors, including Pamela Samuelson and Julie Cohen); Tyler T. Ochoa, “Origins and 
Meanings of the Public Domain”, (2002) 28 U. Dayton L. Rev. 215; James Boyle, “The Second Enclosure 
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain”, (2003) 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 33, 68; Mark 
Rose, “Nine-Tenths of the Law:  The English Copyright Debates and the Rhetoric of the Public Domain”, 
(2003) 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 75; Pamela Samuelson, “Mapping the Digital Public Domain:  Threats 
and Opportunities”, (2003) 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 147 ; Yochai Benkler, “Free as the Air to Common 
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain”, (1999) 74 N.Y.U L. Rev. 354, 
361-62; Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World (New 
York 2001).  For a more skeptical view of “commons” discourse, see Anupam Chander and Madhavi 
Sunder, “The Romance of the Public Domain”, (2004) 92 California Law Review 1331.. 
2 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down 
Culture and Control Creativity (New York 2004). 
3 See, e.g., Mark Rose, “The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v Becket and the Genealogy of Modern 
Authorship”, in Brad Sherman and Alain Strowel (eds.), Of Authors and Origins: Essays on Copyright Law 
(New York 1994), 23, 30 (“it might be said that the London booksellers invented the modern author, 
constructing him as a weapon in their struggle with the booksellers of the provinces.”) 
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domain may differ from some of yours’, but we probably agree that there is and should 
be an ever-growing corpus of material over which no author or successor in title may 
exercise a private right.  What provokes this lecture, by contrast, are what I perceive to be 
anachronistic assertions of the “immemorial” quality of today’s aggressive concept of the 
public domain.4  Some of these arguments look to me like the Roche-Bobois “provincial” 
line of furniture: modern pieces with nicks and wormholes introduced to impart antique 
appeal.  The normative claims for the public domain should persuade on their own, 
without the added patina of ancient precept.  I therefore propose to examine what were 
the respective domains of author and public at copyright’s inception, in 18th-19th century 
Britain, France and America.  I acknowledge immediately that the search uncovers more 
ambiguity than certainty, more matters for further inquiry than tidy findings.  I hope I 





We might start the inquiry into the respective domains of author and public with 
the observation that the term “public domain” did not exist in early copyright law.5  The 
phrase is a late arrival, entering English and American copyright discourse in the second 
half of the 19th century, apparently borrowed from the French around the time of the 
drafting of the Berne Convention in the last quarter of the 19th century.6  In France, the 
term had been employed by the mid 19th-century to mean expiration of copyright term.7   
When imported into Britain and the US, the term was used in the same way.  This does 
not mean that the broader concepts that the “public domain” today embraces did not exist 
in some form in the eighteenth century, but simply that no single locution conveniently 
and universally captured the concept of non property in works of authorship.  18th century 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Ochoa, note 1 above, p. 222; Ronan Deazley, Re-Thinking Copyright (forthcoming 2006); L. 
Ray Patterson, “Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use”, (1987) 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 25 (the stationer’s 
copyright “purported to preempt” the public domain while the Statute of Anne “created, or at least 
reestablished” the public domain); James Boyle, note 1 above, (2003) 66 Law & Contemp. Prob. pp. 37-40 
(arguing that a second enclosure movement is eating away at intellectual property that was previously in 
the public domain), Negativeland, “The Public Domain: Two Relationships to a Cultural Public Domain”, 
(2003) 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 239, 251 (the “ancient, universal view of art’s potential subject matter” 
encompassed everything, and has slowly been encroached by the development of capitalism); See also, 
Lawrence Lessig, “Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law: The Creative Commons” (2003) 55 Fla. L. 
Rev. 763, 764 (The public domain is a resource “that creators throughout history have drawn upon 
freely.”). 
5 See, e.g., Mark Rose, note 1 above, p. 84 (“In the early period, [there was] no positive term in which to 
speak affirmatively about the public domain.”) 
6 Id., citing Jessica Litman, “The Public Domain”, (1990) 39 Emory L. J. 965, 975 n.60.  The treatise 
Drone on Copyright (Boston 1879) appears to be one of the first American sources to use the term. 
7 See, e.g., Rapport fait au nom de la Commission rassemblée pour la rédaction d’un projet de loi sur la 
propriété d’arts, de sciences et des lettres, par le Comte de Ségur, Moniteur du 28 mars 1837, reprinted in 2 
Fernand Worms, Etude sur la propriété littéraire, 37 (Paris 1878) (phrase « tomber dans le domaine public 
» used to mean expiration of copyright term).  By contrast, ten years earlier, the legal encyclopedia, Recueil 
alphabétique de Questions de Droit by M. Merlin (4th ed 1828) devotes seven sections and 47 pages to « 
domaine public » but all concern public (and formerly royal) lands.   See also, M. Merlin, Répertoire de 
Jurisprudence, 5th ed. (Paris 1826) pp. 259-327 (same). 
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jurists employed terms like “publici juris,”8 or, in France, “propriété publique,”9 but they 
may not have meant it in the way some modern expositors use “public domain,” to mean 
the non proprietary primordial soup from which we all sup, and freely digesting, bring 
forth further expression for the common delectation. 
 
To ascertain the meaning of these terms at copyright’s inception, we might essay 
a survey of the author’s domain.  If we know what rights the author enjoyed, and on what 
basis he enjoyed them, we might better grasp the realm that remains.  I recognize that this 
approach might be charged with displacing the horse by the cart.  But any order of 
precedence presents similar problems of barnyard organization, for I might equally well 
evoke the conundrum of the chicken and the egg.  Did authors’ rights spawn the public 
domain, or did copyright hatch from the common?  So let’s break out of this maddening 
circuit by asking a different question:  In the beginning, in Britain, France and the US, 
was a published work a public thing?   
 
I start with publication because the printing press gave rise to the conditions to 
which copyright and its predecessor privileges responded: the mass, and potentially 
uncontrolled, reproduction of copies of works, and the eventual rise of a population 
capable of reading them.  Back in the days of the medieval scriptoria, copies were few 
and readers almost as scarce.  Control over access to the physical copy limited the 
number of copies that could be made.10  And even then, some monasteries resorted to a 
kind of technological measure to prevent unauthorized access and copying: they chained 
the books to the walls.11 
 
Almost as soon as there were printing presses there came printing privileges.12  
Ruling authorities perceived two problems that privileges might resolve.  Publishing 
would further the Renaissance revival of the classical authors as well as enhance the 
communication of contemporary Latin and vernacular literature and scholarship.  But, 
along with making desirable works more available, uncontrolled publishing could also 
disseminate undesirable ideas.  Second, uncontrolled publishing could discourage the 
financial undertaking required to print books: second-comers could undercut the profits 
of the first to invest in the labor and materials of printing.  Limiting the number of 
printers would serve both the crown by controlling ideas, and the publisher by controlling 
competition.  In some States separate authorities addressed censorship and competition.  
For example, in France, a royal minister supplied the required “approbation du roi,” but 
the bookseller’s guild, the “corporation des libraires,” implemented the “privilège du 
                                                 
8 See, .e.g, speech of Lord Camden in Donaldson v Beckett, 17 Parl. Hist. Eng. 953, pp. 997, 999 (1774). 
9 See, e.g., report of Le Chapelier, Archives parlementaires (Assemblée nationale) 13 january 1791 p. 210, 
discussed infra part III. 
10 As did the expense and labor-intensiveness of copying.  See generally, Peter K. Yu, “Of Monks, 
Medieval Scribes and Middlemen”, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1, 7. 
11 The hooks and chains can still be seen at the monastery of Poblet in Spain. 
12 The first printing privileges were granted by the city-state of Venice in the second half of the fifteenth 
century.  On the history of printing privileges see generally, Bruce Bugbee, The Genesis of American 
Patent and Copyright Law (Washington 1967) pp. 12-56; Frank Prager, “A History of Intellectual Property 
from 1545 to 1789”, (1944) 26 J Pat. Off. Soc. 711. 
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roi.”13  In England, however, the Stationers Company ultimately covered both,14 an 
unsavory combination which has led some to discredit copyright by emphasizing its 
alleged origins in the suppression of sedition and heresy.15  (I say “alleged” because, for 
reasons which I hope will become apparent, copyright is not the alter ego of the printing 
privilege.) 
 
With the printing privileges in place, a published work would not have been a 
“public thing,” because the “public” was not free to copy the work.  The literate public 
would have been free to read the works and to reap their ideas (or those ideas which 
passed political and ideological muster), but it is unlikely at the time that the new copying 
technology would have given rise to expectations of public entitlement to make and 
distribute copies.  On the contrary, a 1677 King’s Bench decision in a suit brought by the 
Stationers’ Company, referring to an earlier House of Lords ruling, stated: “printing was 
a new invention, and therefore every man could not by the common law have the liberty 
of printing law books.”16 
 
But in England the printing privileges lapsed.  The licensing act expired in 1695, 
and no statutory regime of exclusive rights replaced it until 1710’s Statute of Anne.17  We 
might therefore consider whether this period fostered an expectation of non property (or 
of public entitlement) in published works which would have supplied the framework for 
interpreting the subsequent Statute of Anne.  That is, should the Statute of Anne be seen 
as derogating from a prior public domain default, or does the statute fit within a 
proprietary landscape which persisted despite the expiration of the printing privileges? 
 
Two factors make it unlikely that during this fifteen-year period a concept of the 
public domain as first principle, from which exclusive rights derogated, would have taken 
root and flowered.  First, while the London booksellers who comprised the Stationers 
Company no longer enjoyed a royal monopoly, they still maintained a significant 
economic and technological advantage.  They largely controlled the means of publishing, 
and they controlled their membership.18  So long as the guild could discipline its 
members into respecting each other’s exclusivity, the conditions for propagating a public 
domain would not seem to have been in place. 
 
Second, the lapsing of the Licensing Act terminated the vesting of exclusive 
rights in booksellers.  But that did not necessarily mean that the concept of exclusive 
                                                 
13 See generally Raymond Birn, “The Profits of Ideas:  Privilèges en librairie in Eighteenth-Century 
France" (1970-71) 4 Eighteenth-Century Studies, 131. 
14 14 See generally Cyprian Blagden, The Stationers' Company: A History 1403–1959 (London 1960).  
15 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, “The Copyright Grab”, (Jan. 1996) WIRED, p. 134. 
16 Company of Stationers v. Seymour 1677, 1 Mod 256.  See also John Feather, Publishing, Piracy and 
Politics: An Historical Study of Copyright in Britain (1994) p. 46. 
17 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or 
Purchasers of such Copies, 8 Anne c 19 (1710). 
18 For self-regulation within the printing and bookselling trades during the period between the licensing act 
and the Statute of Anne, see generally Isabella Alexander, “The Metaphysics of the Law”: Drawing the 
Boundaries of Copyright Law 1710-1911 (thesis, Cambridge, 2005) para. [2.3]; Feather, see note 16 above, 
pp. 65-66; Blagden, see note 14 above, pp. 175–77. 
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rights to copy and disseminate works of authorship died along with the printers’ 
monopoly.  Rather, another claimant to those rights appeared -- the author.  As did a 
philosophical and legal theory to connect the author to the rights.  One might query 
whether John Locke would have endorsed the extension of his labor theory of property to 
incorporeal property in the writings of authors.19  He did, after all, urge the expiry of the 
Licensing Act, largely because he objected to the stationers’ “Monopoly of all the Clasick 
Authers and scholers.”20  However, he also supported a limited period (50-70 years) of 
post mortem exclusive rights.21  More importantly, in 1695 he collaborated on the text of 
a new licensing bill, which did not pass, but which would have vested both initial printing 
and reprinting rights in the author.  Locke’s draft, written in March 1695, appears to 
accept the premise of authorial proprietary rights: the text provides that the prohibition on 
printing was “to secure the Authors property in his copy.”22  This proposal is the 
precursor to the Statute of Anne, the first enactment to place the exclusive right initially 
in the hands of the authors rather than of printer-booksellers.   
 
By the late seventeenth-century, authors’ claims may, therefore, have been 
recognized as a matter of natural justice.  But does natural justice translate into 
enforceable rights?  Before authors were vested with statutory rights, could they advance 
a common law claim to exclusive rights in their works?  Authors’ common law claims 
could have occupied what might otherwise have been a legal vacuum (albeit not a de 
facto vacuum) when the Licensing Act lapsed.  However, I have found no case preceding 
the Statute of Anne in which an author alleged a trespass of his property rights in a 
published, or unpublished, work.  Stationers’ Company practice recognized authorial 
rights in unpublished manuscripts, for the booksellers paid contemporary authors for the 
exclusive right to print their works.23  That right, nonetheless, might be said to stem from 
the author’s control over the physical manuscript; the booksellers’ practices do not 
necessarily evidence a common law property right in the author’s disembodied words.24  
That authors might enjoy enforceable incorporeal property rights in their works may well 
have been a new concept.25  The term “literary property” appears to have been coined 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Cambridge 1993) p. 33 
20 John Locke, Memorandum (1694) against the renewal of the licensing act, reprinted in ES de Beer (ed) 
The Correspondence of John Locke (Oxford 1979), vol. 5, pp. 785-91.  Self-interest may have played some 
role in Locke’s objections: a bookseller’s previously-grated printing privilege in Aesop’s Fables blocked 
Locke’s endeavor to publish his own edition.  See Lewis Hyde, “Frames from the Framers: How America’s 
Revolutionaries Imagined Intellectual Property”, (2005) Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Research 
Paper No. 2005-08, 1, 11. 
21 Id. 
22 See Appendix to ES De Beer, note 20 above, p. 795.  See generally, Laura Moscati, “Un “Memorandum” 
di John Locke tra Censorship et Copyright” (2003) LXXVI Rivista di storia del diritto italiano 69.   
23 See, e.g., Feather, note 16 above, p. 67. 
24 See, e.g., William Enfield, “Observations on Literary Property”, (1774) p. 30  reprinted in, The Literary 
Property Debate: Eight Tracts, 1774-1775 (London 1974) ( “The truth seems to be, that although the 
purchasing of a single copy may give the purchaser possession of the sentiments and expressions of a work, 
that is, of the composition itself, it doth not give him such absolute possession of it as to entitle him to … 
the right of multiple copies”) 
25 For the evolution of the concept of incorporeal property rights in works of authorship, see generally Brad 
Sherman and Lionel Bently, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law: The British Experience, 
1760–1911, (Cambridge 1999) pp. 19-35.  For the parallel, albeit later, evolution in France, see Laurent 
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around 1707, when it was invoked in a petition from members of the Company to the 
House of Commons as part of the Stationers’ ongoing attempt to restore the expired 
Licensing Act.26  In an earlier version of the Statute of Anne, from 1710, the preamble 
vaunts the rights of “Authors . . . in whom ye undoubted Property of such Books and 
Writing as the product of their learning and labour remains . . ..”27   If the concept of 
authorial property had not by 1710 received judicial imprimatur, the proposition that 
authors’ intellectual labor justified a right perhaps cognizable at common law seems at 




If authors’ rights did not detract from a preexisting public domain, we might 
nonetheless posit that the Statute of Anne created both copyright proprement dit (that is 
exclusive rights arising out of the creations of authors rather than compensating or 
encouraging printers’ investments) and the concomitant public domain.  For if the statute 
delineated the author’s domain (and, derivatively, the bookseller’s, too), then everything 
the statute left out might be deemed publici juris.  But that is taking a highly positivist 
view of the Statute of Anne.  Whether or not literary property wasn’t property before the 
statute, the effect of an interpretation that makes the statute the sole source of authors’ 
rights is to create (or perpetuate) a vast zone of non property encircling the statute.  
Copyright becomes a little coral reef of private right jutting up from an ocean of public 
domain.  In fact, the respective domains of author and public appear to have been much 
less clearly marked.  Sticking with aquatic landscapes, we might say that the realm of 
copyright was a shoreline of uncertain contours.  The Statute of Anne may have separated 
the waters from the lands, but it did not clearly tell us which was which. 
 
I propose four ways to ascertain whether authors’ rights were confined to the 
contours of the statute.  Two address the existence of copyright, the others its scope.  If 
the Statute of Anne furnished the sole basis for literary property, then the following 
propositions should be true: 
 
1. Subject matter not included within the statute was not protected 
2. Protection for covered subject matter depended on compliance with statutory 
formalities 
3. Rights not included within the statute were not protected 
4. The duration of rights was limited to the statutory term  
 
As we will see, only the last of these ultimately proved to be correct, and it was hotly 
debated, even deplored, at the time by significant expositors of the common law.28  More 
importantly, resolution of the duration issue did not fully contain the author’s domain.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Pfister, « La propriété littéraire est-elle une propriété?  Controverses sur la nature du droit d’auteur au XIXe 
siècle », (July 2005) 205 RIDA 117 
26 See Feather, note 16 above, p. 56. 
27 Id. 
28 See infra at TAN xx.  In the US, Donaldson was also criticized by the legal academy, see James Kent, 
Commentaries on American Law, (Boston 1826) part V, lecture XXXVI pp. 314-15. 
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English judges continued both to grant extra-statutory protections, and to interpret 
hospitably claims that pushed the limits of statutory scope.  
 
1.  Subject matter  
 
The Statute of Anne covered “any book,”29 a term the text did not define.  A later 
enactment, the 1735 Hogarth’s Act,30 provided for exclusive rights in prints and 
engravings.  One might infer from the passage of a law specifically directed at certain 
works of art that “book” was limited to literary works, in book form, that is, in sheets 
printed and bound.  Moreover, if the statute were creating new proprietary rights 
subtracted from the public domain, one might anticipate that the statutory grant would be 
narrowly construed.  Most of the early cases did concern literary works in book form, but 
not all.  Some of them addressed unpublished letters31 and manuscripts,32 an unpublished 
play,33 published roadmaps34 and, finally, musical compositions,35 including music sold 
as single sheets.36  In the cases of maps and musical compositions, a generous reading of 
“book” could bring them within the statute, but the technique of statutory interpretation 
implied a property-friendly premise inconsistent with a view of copyright as derogating 
from a public domain default and therefore compelling narrow construction.  Indeed, to 
fit musical compositions within “any book,” Lord Mansfield in his 1777 decision in Bach 
v Longman elevated the statute’s preamble, which referred to “books and other writings,” 
into operative language,37 though the actual provisions of the Act consistently specified 
only “books.”   
 
 Similarly, beginning in 1741 with Alexander Pope’s suit against Edmund Curl for 
unauthorized publication of letters written by Pope and sent to recipients from whom 
Curl apparently obtained them,38 the English courts routinely enjoined the unauthorized 
publication of letters and manuscripts.39  A manuscript might be considered a “book” (or 
an incipient one), and might also be assimilated to a chattel under its author’s physical 
dominion.  But letters were both less book-like, thus less clear candidates for statutory 
                                                 
29 8 Anne c. 19 s 1. 
30 An Act for the Encouragement of the Arts of designing, engraving and etching historical and other Prints, 
by vesting the Properties thereof in the Inventors and Engravers, during the Time therein mentioned, 8 Geo. 
II c.13 (1735). 
31 See, e.g., Pope v. Curl, [1741] 2 Atk. 342, 26 Eng. Rep. 608 . 
32 See, e.g., Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare, [1758] 2 Eden 329, 28 Eng. Rep. 924; Southey v. 
Sherwood, [1817] 2 Mer 435, 173 Eng. Rep. 1006.  
33 Macklin v. Richardson, [1770] Amb 694, 27 Eng. Rep. 451. 
34 Carnan v. Bowles, [1786] 2 Bro CC 80, 28 Eng. Rep. 45 and 1 Cox 283; 29 Eng. Rep. 1168, Cary v. 
Faden, [1799] 5 Ves 24, 31 Eng. Rep. 453, Cary v. Longman and Rees, [1801] 1 East 358, 102 Eng. Rep. 
138. 
35 Bach v. Longman, [1777] 2 Cowp 263, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274. 
36 Clementi v. Golding, [1809] 2 Camp 25, 170 Eng. Rep. 1069; Clementi v. Goulding, [1809] 11 East 244, 
103 Eng. Rep. 998. 
37 2 Cowp. at 624, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1274. 
38 Pope v. Curl, [1741] 2 Atk. 342, 26 Eng. Rep. 608.. 
39 Id.; Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare, [1758] 2 Eden 329, 28 Eng. Rep. 924; Southey v. Sherwood, 
[1817] 2 Mer 435, 173 Eng. Rep. 1006; Perceval v. Phipps, [1813] 2 Ves & Beam. 19, 24, 35 Eng. Rep. 
225, 277; Thompson v. Stanhope, [1774] Ambler R. 737. 740, 27 Eng. Rep. 476, 477; Gee v. Pritchard and 
Anderson, [1818] 2 Swan 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 679. 
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coverage; and, having been sent to their intended recipients, had left the physical control 
of their authors.  A traditional trespass claim thus would have been rather attenuated.  But 
neither of these features gave Lord Harwicke difficulty.  Since the defendant had 
assembled Pope’s separate letters into a book, the statute’s “book” condition was held to 
have been met.  The chancellor followed this sleight of hand with another, by declaring 
that “any other learned work” was within the statute, including those their authors never 
intended to be published.  He then established that a “learned work” need not aspire to 
pedagogy (or pedantry); informal letters on familiar subjects could do great service to 
mankind as well.  He surmounted the chattel problem with similarly vaulting ease.  Yes, 
the recipient had the “property of the paper,” but the author’s dispatch of the physical 
medium did not transfer the property in the words.  The right of first publication thus was 
distinct from the ownership of the letter or the manuscript.  Lord Hardwicke’s distinction 
evidences the growing recognition that incorporeal subject matter can be the object of 
property.  As Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman have demonstrated for British copyright, 
and Laurent Pfister for French copyright, this conceptualization did not come easily: 18th 
century British copyright skeptics found the term “literary property” oxymoronic, 




 Was the first publication right a statutory property right or a common law 
property right?  The Statute of Anne vested in authors the right of “printing” as well as 
“reprinting;” the former could have covered first publication.  The overall focus of the 
statute, however, was directed towards the regulation of the printed, published copies -- 
and the guild that purveyed them.  Indeed, the printer/bookseller-centrism of the Statute 
of Anne has led many scholars to conclude that the figure of the author, having lent 
rhetorical flair to the preamble and moral appeal to the preceding lobbying,41 was nearly 
irrelevant to the actual regime the Statute established.42  Part of that regime included the 
conditioning of the statute’s remedies on compliance with formalities.  These 
requirements, notably registration of the work with the Stationers Company upon 
publication, were per se irrelevant to unpublished works.43  The role of formalities in a 
copyright system can tell us a lot about the premises underlying protection.  If copyright 
is conditioned on compliance with formalities, then the right may be viewed in purely 
positivistic terms.  No registration, no right, full stop.  The policy underlying registration 
and similar notice-giving formalities is set out in the Statute of Anne:  
 
whereas many persons may through ignorance offend against this Act, unless 
some provision be made whereby the property in every such book , as is intended 
by this act to be secured to the proprietor or proprietors thereof may be 
ascertained . . .   That nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to extend to 
                                                 
40 Sherman & Bently, see note 25 above, p. 19 n.31, quoting An Enquiry Into the Nature and Origin of 
Literary Property, attributed to William Warburton (London, printed for Wiliam Flexney 1762). 
41 See, e.g., Mark Rose, note 19 above. 
42 See, e.g.; Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville 1968) p. 147 (suggesting 
that giving the right to authors was merely a convenient means to attack the stationers’ monopoly); Feather, 
see note 16 above, p. 51.  
43 See 8 Anne c 19 section 2.  Moreover the term of protection ran from first publication, see section 1. 
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subject any bookseller, printer or other person whatsoever, to the forfeitures or 
penalties therein mentioned . . . unless the title to the copy of such book or books 
hereafter published, shall, before such publication, be entered in the Register 
Book of the Company of Stationers . . .44 
 
If the drafters of the statute feared that “persons [might] through ignorance offend 
against” the author’s or proprietor’s exclusive rights, that might imply that, absent 
registration of the work, the public was entitled to assume that the work was free to be 
printed or reprinted.  In other words, the default position, away from which the author or 
proprietor must educate the public through proper registration, would be free 
appropriability.  This in turn would suggest a skeptical and skimping view of the 
proprietary right. 
 
 The caselaw, however, indicates a different view.  Non compliance with 
formalities seems not to have been raised as a defense when the claim concerned an 
unpublished work.  Arguably, one who publishes an unpublished manuscript knows that 
he is invading the author’s right.  But, at least until Lord Hardwicke bifurcated the 
property rights in unpublished letters,45 it is not apparent that the recipient of a letter 
would have known that he was offending against the statute if he published the words the 
author had purposefully communicated to him.  If unpublished letters were intended to be 
within the Statute of Anne, then the rationale for the formalities should have extended to 
them.  If unpublished letters were not within the statute, then the author’s claim must 
have lain in the common law of trespass, and the statute would not have supplanted that 
claim.  In the latter event, the statute could not have defined the entire universe of 
enforceable literary property. 
 
 There is an additional explanation for the weakness of formality-based defenses, 
and consequently of the positivistic concept of copyright that formalities imply: even 
when it came to published works, the courts concluded that formalities conditioned only 
the special statutory remedies; common law remedies remained available when the author 
or proprietor had not registered the work with the Stationers Company.46  Thus, the 
statutory claim sat atop an established common law structure, enhancing, but not 
defining, the available relief.  This observation, however, supports two conflicting 
                                                 
44 Id. section 2. 
45 Pope v. Curl, [1741] 2 Atk. 342, 26 Eng. Rep. 608. 
46 See, e.g., Blackwell v. Harper, [1740] 2 Atk 93, 26 Eng. Rep. 458; Beckford v. Hood, [1798] 7 TR 620, 
101 Eng. Rep. 1164. 
 Later interpretations of Hogarth’s Act, however, required the engraver to have placed the date of 
first publication upon all distributed copies.  See, Thompson v Symonds, [1792] 5 Term. R. 41, 45, 101 
Eng.Rep. 23, 26 (Lord Kenyon C.J. "The date is of importance, that the public may know the period of the 
monopoly."); Harrison v Hogg, [1827] 2 Ves. Jun. 323, 327, 30 Eng.Rep. 654, 656 (1794) (per R.P. Arden 
M.R.); Newton v Cowie, 4 Bing 234, 130 Eng.Rep. 759 (esp. per Best C.J. "It is impossible to suppose the 
legislative intended that the public should not have the protection afforded them by the first act against 
fraudulent continuance of the monopoly beyond the term prescribed by that act.").  In Brooks v Cock, 
[1835] 3 Ad. & El. 138, 140-41, 111 Eng.Rep. 365, 366 Lord Denman CJ. rejected the analogy with 
Beckford v Hood, "It is the proprietor's own fault if he suffers a hardship. It is easy for him to comply with 
a regulation which is very simple and useful, and which makes the date part of the description of the plate 
to be protected". 
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conclusions.  The first conclusion would be that the courts’ resort to common law 
remedies demonstrates that a common law right pre-existed the statute, and persisted 
concurrently.  The second, competing, conclusion would be that when parliament creates 
a new right, it is assumed that remedies will be available to enforce it, whether or not the 
statute expressly includes remedies.47  Thus, any statutorily-created right can be enforced 
by common law remedies, in addition to whatever specific relief the statute sets out. 
 
 To determine whether a common law basis for proprietary rights ran concurrently 
with, or instead was subsumed within the statute, we turn to the third proposition, that the 
statute articulates the full and sole scope of the right. 
 
3. Scope of the right 
 
The Statute of Anne vested authors and proprietors with the rights to print, reprint 
and sell.  In modern copyright parlance, these are the rights to reproduce and distribute 
the work.48  If these are the only legally cognizable rights, we would expect courts to 
reject any claims to protect a work against unauthorized public performance, or against 
unauthorized adaptation.  Once again, the caselaw serves up an ambiguous response. 
 
We will first consider the scope of the rights to print and reprint.  Were these 
limited to dissemination of copies of the work in the same form and with the same 
contents as originally published, then partial copying or revision of the prior work would 
not have been held to infringe.  The contrast of the Statute of Anne with Hogarth’s Act 
could have supplied further textual support for crimping the concept of “printing and 
reprinting” in the Statute of Anne to integral copying.  Hogarth’s Act forbade 
reproducing the protected image “in the whole or in part, by varying, adding to, or 
diminishing from the main design.”49  It also targeted persons who “shall print, reprint or 
import for sale, . . . any such prints, or any parts thereof.”50  The booksellers themselves 
seem to have appreciated the potential consequences of the absence from the Statute of 
Anne of “or any parts thereof” language.  They petitioned parliament in 1735 for 
amendments extending the prohibition to unauthorized publication “in parcels at different 
times and in different publications,” apparently in response to the growing practice of 
magazine serialization.  This bill having failed, the booksellers petitioned two years later, 
also unsuccessfully, for a three-year embargo on unauthorized translations and 
abridgements.51  The legislative record thus seems to favor narrow construction of the 
scope of the reproduction right in books. 
 
The courts did, shortly following Hogarth’s Act and the rejection of the 
booksellers’ bills, devise a doctrine of “fair abridgement,” permitting second-comers to 
update, correct, summarize, or partially copy copyrighted works.  The basis of the fair 
                                                 
47 See argument of counsel in Beckford v. Hood, 101 Eng. Rep. pp. 1165-66. 
48 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)(3); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 c. 48 § 16(a)(b) (Eng.). 
49 8 Geo. II c.13 (1735) section 1. 
50 Id. 
51 On the 1735 and 1737 bills, see generally, Ronan Deazley, On the Origin of the Right to Copy: Charting 
the Movement of Copyright Law in Eighteenth-Century Britain (1695-1775) (Oxford 1994) pp. 94-108. 
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abridgement rule, however, seems to me more consistent with a labor-based property 
concept than with a narrow application of statutory text.  In the 1740 decision in Gyles v 
Wilcox,52 concerning the alleged copying of a law book, Lord Hardwicke considered 
whether “all abridgements” should “be brought within the meaning of this act of 
parliament.”  Hardwick rejected a narrow interpretation of the statute, for reasons worth 
repeating here: 
 
As to what has been said . . . of the acts being a monopoly, and therefore ought to 
receive strict construction, I am quite of a different opinion, and that it ought to 
receive a liberal construction, for it is very far from being a monopoly, as it is 
intended to secure the property of books in the authors themselves, or the 
purchasers of the copy, as some recompence for their pains and labour in such 
works as may be of use to the learned world.53 
 
Isabella Alexander has recently written eloquently regarding the public interest (“use to 
the learned world”) aspects of Lord Hardwicke’s reasoning in this decision, and of early 
British copyright in general.54  I propose to focus on the “recompense for [authorial] 
pains and labour.”  Lord Hardwicke stated that books that “are colourably shortened 
only” were “undoubtedly within the meaning of the act of parliament, and are a mere 
evasion of the statute.”  But a “fair abridgement” falls outside the act in that a “real and 
fair abridgement . . . may with great propriety be called a new book, because . . . the 
invention, learning, and judgment of the author is shewn in them.”55  In other words, 
because he has expended mental labor, a fair abridger is an author, too.  The labor 
rationale that justifies the first author’s property also confines it.  The colorable shortener 
(or, to use Justice Story’s later US characterization of the same lowlife figure, the facile 
user of the scissors56) is not an author because he has contributed nothing of his own to 
the prior work.  In the case of a fair abridgement, by contrast, we encounter not an 
absence of property rights, but two contending property rights, both arising out of 
“invention, learning, and judgment.”  
 
 The fair abridgement doctrine created a conceptual difficulty as challenging as the 
recognition of incorporeal property.  If the fair abridger is an author, he cannot at the 
same time be an infringer.  But if he cannot be an infringer, then, absent express statutory 
provision of an adaptation right, the statutory reproduction right will not reach 
unauthorized abridgements and revisions of works even when these may prejudice both 
the author’s economic interest, by underselling the longer versions, and his moral 
interests by, as Lord Hardwicke recognized, “mistaking and curtailing the sense of an 
author.”57  It took almost one hundred years for the British courts to devise an adaptation 
                                                 
52  [1740] 2 Atk 141, 26 Eng. Rep. 489. 
53 2 Atk. at 143, 26 Eng. Rep. at 490. 
54 Alexander, see note 18 above, at para. [4.2]. 
55 2 Atk. at 143, 26 Eng. Rep. at 490. 
56 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345  (C.C. D.Mass. 1841).  On Folsom v. Marsh, see generally, R. 
Anthony Reese, “The Story of Folsom v Marsh:  Distinguishing Between Infringing and Legitimate Uses”, 
in Jane C. Ginsburg and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss (eds.), Intellectual Property Stories (New York 2005) 
p. 259. 
57 2 Atk. p. 143, 26 Eng. Rep. p. 490. 
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right, a reconceptualization achieved in the House of Lords’ 1835 decision in d’Almaine v 
Boosey.58  There is an understandable economic impetus behind the Lords’ extension of 
the opera composer’s copyright to encompass re-orchestrations of selections into dance 
tunes.  By 1835, a significant middle class with the means to purchase and perform music 
at home had emerged, thus creating a market for derivative versions of musical works.  
(The same factors may have contributed to the 1809 King’s Bench ruling in Clementi v 
Goulding that a single sheet of music was a “book.”59)  But d’Almaine’s rationale 
confronts head-on the conflicting claims of the second author -- and overcomes them by 
denigrating the quality of the adapter’s authorship: “The original air requires the aid of 
genius for its construction, but a mere mechanic in music can make the adaptation or 
accompaniment.”60  If the second author is a genius-free mechanic, in other words, if he 
not really an author, then he can be an infringer.  Anne Barron has pointed out that 
d’Almaine may be the first English judicial recognition of the Romantic Author.61  For 
our purposes, d’Almaine closes the circle the courts created in Gyles v Wilcox: 
articulating the scope of the author’s rights not in terms of statutory text, but with 
reference to the nature of the second author’s labor. 
 
 The other right we will explore is even more clearly extra-statutory.  The Statute 
of Anne did not provide for public performance rights.  This is understandable in light of 
its focus on the printing trade.  But if a play were performed without authorization, what 
recourse would its author or proprietor (in this case, the theater manager) have?  The few 
cases decided before parliament enacted a performance right in 183362 are inconclusive.  
The earliest, Coleman v Wathen,63 decided by the King’s Bench in 1793, concerned an 
unauthorized performance of a play.  The defendant had apparently memorized the 
plaintiff’s work, An Agreeable Surprise, while it was being performed, and then to 
plaintiff’s disagreeable surprise, performed it on a rival stage.  The plaintiff cried 
“piracy!” and argued both that the performance should be considered a publication within 
the Statute of Anne, and that the author had rights independently of the Statute.  The 
court dismissed the claim, stating that the performance was not a publication.  The two 
succinct opinions do not address the claim of extra-statutory rights, but their silence may 
be interpreted as rejecting the second line of argument as well. 
 
 By contrast, in Morris v Harris (1814)64 and Morris v Kelly (1820),65 injunctions 
issued against the unauthorized performance of published plays, but no reasoning is given 
as to the legal basis for the restraint.  Finally, in Murray v Elliston,66 the King’s Bench in 
1822 addressed a claim arising out of an unauthorized performance of a tragedy 
                                                 
58 [1835] 1 Y & C Ex 288, 160 Eng. Rep. 117. 
59 Clementi v. Golding, [1809] 2 Camp 25, 170 Eng. Rep. 1069; Clementi v. Goulding, [1809] 11 East 244, 
103 Eng. Rep. 998. 
60 [1835] 1 Y & C Ex at 302, 160 Eng. Rep. p. 123. 
61 Anne Barron, “Copyright Law’s Musical Work”, (2006) 15 Social and Legal Studies, 101, 120-22. 
62 An Act to amend the Laws relating to Dramatic Literary Property, 3 Will. IV c.15 (1833). 
63 Coleman v. Wathen [1793] 5 TR 245, 101 Eng. Rep. 137. 
64 Unreported (Ch. 1814), cited in Richard Godson, Practical Treatise on the Law of Patents for Inventions 
and of Copyright (London 1823) 285. 
65 [1820] 1 Jac. & W. 481, 37 Eng. Rep. 451. 
66 [1822] 5 B & Ald 657, 106 Eng. Rep. 1331. 
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published by Lord Byron.  The defendant cited Donaldson v Beckett67 (of which more 
momentarily) and Coleman v Wathen68 to assert that no remedy could exist outside the 
statute, and the statute did not extend to performance rights.   But the defendant then 
advanced an additional rationale for dismissing the action.  Expounding on “the nature of 
copyright,” defendant’s counsel urged: 
 
The injury then which an author sustains by the violation of his copyright is this; 
that a stranger, without permission, disposes of the use and possession of this, his 
book, and thereby receives the profits to which he, the author, is justly entitled.  If 
then the book be not in all reasonable strictness such as may be called the author’s 
own book, as if it be a bona fide abridgement, Gyles v Wilcox shews that the 
author has no remedy.  Now, in the present case, a theatrical exhibition falls 
within the principle above laid down.  Persons go thither, not to read the work, or 
to hear it read, but to see the combined effect of poetry, scenery, and acting.  Now 
of these three things, two are not produced by the author of the work, and the 
combined effect is just as much a new production, and even more so than the 
printed abridgement of a work.69 
 
The court’s laconic (or laconically reported) dismissal of the action offers a clue to which 
of the two arguments the judges may have found most persuasive: “an action cannot be 
maintained . . . for publicly acting and representing the said tragedy, abridged in the 
manner aforesaid . . .” 70  I suggest we have here not an absence of statutory rights, but 




 We turn now to the last of our four propositions, addressing the duration of 
copyright.  Here, the statute definitively trumped any pre-existing or concurrent common 
law rights.  I do not propose to re-tell the oft-told tale of Donaldson v Beckett,71 nor to 
enter the fray of sorting out which judge voted which way on the five propositions put to 
them:72 whether copyright existed at common law before publication; whether it existed 
at common law after publication; whether the Statute of Anne took away the common 
law right; whether the common law right was perpetual; whether the Statute of Anne took 
away the perpetual right.73  We do – more or less -- know the bottom line: whether or not 
common law copyright was perpetual and persisted past publication, the Statute of Anne 
                                                 
67 [1774] 2 Bro PC 129, 4 Burr. 2408; 1 Eng. Rep. 837 
68 [1793] Coleman v. Wathen, 5 TR 245, 101 Eng. Rep. 137. 
69 5 B & Ald at 660, 106 Eng. Rep. at 1332. 
70 5 B & Ald at 661, 106 Eng. Rep. at 1332 (emphasis supplied). 
71 For prior re-tellings, see, e.g., Deazley, note 51 above, pp. 191-210; Mark Rose, “Author as Proprietor” 
note 3 above; Feather, note 16 above pp. 89-95; Howard B. Abrams, “The Historic Foundation of 
American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright”, (1983) 29 Wayne L. Rev. 
1119; Augustine Birrell,  Seven Lectures on the Law and History of Copyright in Books (London 1899) pp. 
99-138. 
72 See, e.g., Abrams, note 71 above; Deazley, note 51 above. 
73 4 Burr. at 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. At 357–58, 2 Bro. at 144–45, 1 Eng. Rep. pp. 846–47, 17 Parl. Hist. Eng. 
pp. 970–71. 
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limited the copyright term, at least for published works, to the 14 years provided by the 
statute, with an additional 14 years if the author were still living at the expiration of the 
first term.  Because the peers did not address the five questions put to the judges, and 
most of them gave no reasons at all for their votes,74 we do not know which if any of the 
following propositions Donaldson v Beckett stands for: that there was no common law 
copyright; that any common law copyright expired upon publication; that the Statute of 
Anne preempted common law copyright entirely; that the Statute of Anne preempted 
common law copyright to the extent it overlapped with statutory copyright, but left 
untouched those areas not specifically addressed by the statute.75 
 
 The controversy over common law copyright that culminated in Donaldson is also 
known as the “battle of the booksellers,”76 but some of its most heated rhetoric concerned 
authors.  These included the lofty pronouncements of Lord Mansfield and Blackstone, 77 
as well as interested parties’ broadsheets, extolling authors’ labor-based claims to literary 
property.78  The other side tended to emphasize the public interest in the spread of ideas79 
(though literary propertarians never asserted a copyright claim to ideas as such).80  Lord 
Camden’s speech in Donaldson, if carefully excerpted, would take pride of place on 
anyone’s Top Ten list of public domain advocacy. For example:  
                                                 
74 See 17 Parl. Hist. Eng. p. 1003 (recording the names of those peers for the resulting 32-11 vote). 
75 See Mark Rose, “Author as Proprietor” note 3 above, p. 45 (“The Lords’ decision did not touch the basic 
contention that the author had a property in the product of his labour.”) 
76 See Birrell, note 71 above, p. 99. 
77 See, “Speeches or Arguments of the Judges of the Court of King’s Bench” (1771) p. 94 (Lord 
Mansfield’s opinion in Millar v. Taylor, pronouncing what is “just” for authors) reprinted in The Literary 
Property Debate: Seven Tracts, 1747-1773 (New York 1974); Sir David Rae, Lord Eskgrove, “Information 
For Mess. John Hinton, and Attorney; Against Mess. Alexander Donaldson, and Others” (1773) p. 44  
reprinted in The Literary Property Debate: Six Tracts: 1764-1774, (New York 1975) (citing book 2, 
chapter 26, § 8 of Blackstone’s Commentaries).   
78 Francis Hargrove, “An Argument in Defence of Literary Property” (1774) p. 21; “Information for John 
MacKenzie of Delvine, Writer to the Signet, and Others, Trustees Appointed by Mrs. Anne Smith, Widow 
of Mr. Thomas Ruddiman, Late Keeper of the Advocates Library, Pursuers, Against John Robertson, 
Printer in Edinburgh, Defender” (1771) pp. 10-1 reprinted in The Literary Property Debate: Seven Tracts, 
1747-1773; James Ralph, “The Case of the Authors by Profession or Trade, Stated With Regard To 
Booksellers, the Stage, and the Public” (1758) p. 2 reprinted in Freedom of the Press and the Literary 
Property Debate: Six Tracts, 1755-1770 (New York 1974); William Enfield, LL.D., “Observations on 
Literary Property” (1774) pp. 19-20 reprinted in The Literary Property Debate: Eight Tracts, 1774-1775 
(New York 1974).  
79 J. MacLaurin, “Considerations on the Nature and Origin of Literary Property” (1767) p. 34 reprinted in 
Freedom of the Press and the Literary Property Debate: Six Tracts, 1755-1770 (“The perpetuating the 
Monopoly of Books, must inevitably enhance their Prices beyond all Bounds, the infallible Consequence of 
which is to retard, and indeed stop altogether the Progress of Learning.”); “A Memorial for the Booksellers 
of Edinburgh and Glasgow, Relating to the Process Against Them by some of the London Booksellers; 
which Depended Before the Court of Session, and is now under Appeal” (1747) p. 12 reprinted in The 
Literary Property Debate: Seven Tracts, 1747-1773; Thomas Hayter, “An Essay on the Liberty of the 
Press, Chiefly as it Respects Personal Slander” (1755) pp. 38-9, reprinted in Freedom of the Press and the 
Literary Property Debate: Six Tracts, 1755-1770.  See also “A Letter from a Gentleman in Edinburgh, to 
his Friend in London; Concerning Literary Property” (1769) p. 15 reprinted in Freedom of the Press and 
the Literary Property Debate: Six Tracts, 1755-1770 (charging that self-interest underlay Blackstone’s 
espousal of the booksellers’ position). 
80 Hargrove 36; “Information for John MacKenzie” p. 12; Rae, “Information For Mess. John Hinton” 
(1773) p. 17; William Enfield, “Observations on Literary Property” (1774) p. 30.   
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If there be anything in the world common to all mankind, science and learning are 
in their nature publici juris, and they ought to be as free and general as air or 
water.  They forget their Creator, as well as their fellow creatures, who wish to 
monopolize his noblest gifts and greatest benefits.  Why did we enter into society 
at all, but to enlighten one another’s minds, and improve our faculties, for the 
common welfare of the species?  Those great men, those favoured mortals, those 
sublime spirits, who share that ray of divinity which we call genius, are intrusted 
by Providence with the delegated power of imparting to their fellow-creatures that 
instruction which heaven meant for universal benefit; they must not be niggards to 
the world, or hoard up for themselves the common stock.81 
 
But read a little further, and we discover a less seductive vision. Lord Camden goes on to 
lament filthy lucre’s defilement of the pristine calling of authorship: 
 
Glory is the reward of science, and those who deserve it, scorn all meaner views: I 
speak not of the scribblers for bread, who teaze the press with their wretched 
productions; fourteen years is too long a privilege for their perishable trash.  It 
was not for gain that Bacon, Newton, Milton, Locke, instructed and delighted the 
world; it would be unworthy of such men to traffic with a dirty bookseller for so 
much a sheet of letter press.82 
 
Given the rise of the professional author in the 18th century, this feature of Lord 
Camden’s oration was retrograde even its day.83  As Catherine Macaulay then wryly 
observed, the need to pay the “sordid butchers and bakers . . . are evils which the sublime 
flights of poetic fancy do not always soar above.”84   Camden’s stance, and the outcome 
in the case, also evoked the ire of legal commentators of the time.  Gilles Jacob’s 1797 
Law Dictionary attributes to Cambridge law don Edward Christian the confrontational 
assertion that because Donaldson “was contrary to the opinion of Lord Mansfield, of the 
learned Commentator [(Blackstone)], and of several other judges . . . every person may 
still be permitted to indulge his own opinion upon the propriety of it, without incurring 
the imputation of arrogance.”85  And such indulgences abounded.  In his forthcoming 
                                                 
81 17 Parl. Hist. Eng. p. 999. 
82 Id. p. 1000.  Lord Camden’s rhetoric evokes that of Boileau, almost a century earlier, deploring those 
who “disgusted with glory and famished for gain/indenture their muse to a bookseller/and convert a divine 
art into a mercenary trade.”  See Boileau, chant IV Art poétique (1688-96): 
Je sais qu’un noble esprit peut sans honte et sans crime 
Tirer de son travail un tribut legitime 
Mais je ne puis souffrir ces auteurs renommes 
Qui, degoûtés de gloire et d’argent affamés, 
Mettent leur Apollon au gages d’un libraire 
En font d’un art divin un métier mercenaire. 
83 On “the development of authorship as a business” in the 18th century, see, e.g., 1 Victor Bonham-Carter, 
Authors by Profession (London  1978) pp. 11-32; Brean S. Hammond, Professional Imaginative Writing in 
England, 1670–1740:  “Hackney for Bread” (1997); A.S. Collins, Authorship in the Days of Johnson 
(1927). 
84 Catherine Macaulay, A Modest Plea for the Property of Copyright (Bath 1774) p. 15. 
85 Giles Jacob, The Law Dictionary (London 1797) “Literary Property,” 1st page, col. 2 of entry 
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book, Ronan Deazley conjures up a virtual conspiracy of early nineteenth-century 





 Let us leave the cabal of British commentators and travel across the Channel to 
consider how the French envisioned the respective domains of author and public.  French 
copyright today is generally considered, at least by “les anglo-saxons” -- by which the 
French curiously mean anglo-americans -- to be fundamentally authorial property-
oriented.87  Even the public domain, in the strict sense of copyright-expired works, is not 
absolutely property-free: authors’ moral rights are perpetual, and can be invoked to 
protect the integrity of works whose authors have been dead well past the statutory post-
mortem period.88  The risk of rampaging moral rights-bearing remote heirs is not 
theoretical, as the publishers of a purported sequel to Les Misérables learned recently to 
their dismay.89 
 
 But it was not always thus.  Of the three copyright systems here reviewed, 
France’s was at first the closest to acknowledging a public domain default, emphasizing 
the public’s property as the backdrop to private rights.  Like England, France had a 
longstanding regime of printing privileges.  These, however, ended not with the whimper 
of the lapsing of the Licensing Act, but with the bang of the night of August 4, 1789, and 
the general abolition of all privileges.90  Whatever the lingering de facto power of the 
corporation des libraries de Paris, de jure and politically the message was clear: 
henceforth, the press is free, not only of censorship, but also of proprietary claims. 
 
 The first French copyright enactment did not restore private rights in printed 
works; instead it created a dramatists’ public performance right.  This was not the 
principal motivation for the Law of January 13, 1791.  Its reporter, Le Chapelier, was the 
moving spirit behind, and gave his name to, a later 1791 law dissolving guilds and 
corporations.  So it should be no surprise that most of his report and the ensuing law 
aimed to repulse the pretensions of the Comédie française, whose members sought to 
retain their monopoly over the works of Corneille, Molière and Racine.  Indeed, it 
appears from the report that the dramatists’ first objective was to destroy the comédiens’ 
                                                 
86 Ronan Deazley, Re-Thinking Copyright (forthcoming 2006). 
87 By many French, too: a basic course in literary history and theory declares, “the French conception is 
personalist and favors the interest of the author over that of society, all the while permitting the free public 
circulation of ideas.”   -- Antoine Compagnon, Course « What is an Author » lesson 9, Intellectual 
Property, course given at the University of Paris IV-Sorbonne, division of French and comparative 
literature, www.fabula.org/compagnon/auteur9.php 
88 See Code de la propriété intellectuelle, art L-121-1, cl. 2. 
89 See Pierre Hugo v. Editions Plon, Paris Court of Appeals, decision of March 31, 2004, 202 RIDA (Oct. 
2004) 292, note Pollaud-Dulian (Victor Hugo during his lifetime rejected all requests to create sequels to 
Les Misérables, the publisher who presents new novels as the continuation of Les Misérables therefore 
violates Hugo’s perpetual moral rights; court awards damages to Hugo heir and to literary authors’ society). 
90 Or more accurately, a couple of bangs, because, despite the abolition of privileges, the Paris Book Guild 
was not definitively suppressed until the decree of March 17, 1791, see Carla Hesse, Publishing and 
Cultural Politics in Revolutionary Paris 1789-1810 (Berkeley 1991) pp. 47-56 
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exclusivity.  The dramatists appear to have situated their second demand, for control over 
their works, within the rhetoric of the public domain.  According to the report, the 
dramatists’ petition 
 
in seeking for the authors and their heirs or grantees the fullest property in their 
works during their life and five years following their death, recognizes and even 
invokes the rights of the public, and does not hesitate to admit that after the five-
year period, the authors’ works are a public property.91 
 
Turning, after much execration of the Comédiens, to the dramatists’ property right, Le 
Chapelier opened with a ringing affirmation of the principle of authorial property: 
 
The most sacred, the most legitimate, the most indisputable, and if I may say so, 
the most personal of all properties is the work which is the fruit of a writer’s 
thoughts. 
 
This excerpt also makes the top ten list for selective quotation, however, because 
property-enthusiasts tend to leave Le Chapelier at this rhetorical high point, before he lets 
the other shoe drop.92  He continues: 
 
But it is a property of a different kind from all the other properties.  [Once the 
author has disclosed the work to the public] the writer has affiliated the public 
with his property, or rather has fully transmitted his property to the public.  
However, because it is extremely just that men who cultivate the domain of ideas 
be able to draw some fruits of their labors, it is necessary that, during their whole 
lives and some years after their deaths, no one may, without their consent, dispose 
of the product of their genius.  But also, after the appointed period, the public’s 
property begins, and everyone should be able to print and publish the works that 
have contributed to enlighten the human spirit.93 
 
Article 2 of the proposed law declares that the works of authors who have been dead for 
five years “are a public property.”94  Thus there is no ambiguity about the end point of the 
author’s domain.  Moreover, Le Chapelier’s concept of the public domain appears more 
extensive than expiration of term.  The public’s property interest is incipient as soon as 
the author discloses his work.  Authors’ labors justify their temporary property rights, but 
the public’s more fundamental claims form an ever-present background.   
 
                                                 
91 Archives Parlementaires, Assemblée nationale, 13 January 1791 p. 210. 
92 See, e.g., Frédéric Rideau, La Formation du droit de la propriété littéraire en France et en Angleterre: 
Une convergence oubliée (Aix-en-Provence 2004) p. 263 and n. 751 (pointing out that quotations from Le 
Chapelier are « frequently truncated. »).  For an attempt to trace the origins of the truncation, see Jane C. 
Ginsburg, “A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America” in Brad 
Sherman and Alain Strowel (eds.),  Of Authors and Origins: Essays on Copyright Law (Oxford 1994) pp. 
131, 144 n.50 
93 Archives parlementaires, see above, pp. 212-13. 
94 Id. p. 214. 
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 France did not enact a reproduction right until 2 years later,95 though laws were 
proposed in the interim, one of which strongly emphasized authors’ proprietary rights, 
melding a variety of justifications, including France’s debt to the writings of authors that 
shaped “the opinion that smashed all forms of despotism in France.”96  This proposal 
included special statutory remedies more rugged than the Statute of Anne’s damasking of 
infringing copies.  An infringer would be exposed in the public square for three hours, 
chained to a placard labeled “thief infringer.”97  -- An idea for record companies’ pursuit 
of file sharers? 
 
 The 1793 Report of Lakanal accompanying the law installing a reproduction right 
begins defensively, deeming property in the “productions of genius” the “least 
contestable, the one whose increase cannot harm republican equality, nor offend liberty.”  
The rhetoric then grows warmer, extolling “such a great revolution as ours” for making 
clear the simple justice of recognizing that property right.  Lakanal later rebuts Le 
Chapelier’s characterization of a published work as a “propriété publique”: it makes no 
sense, he contends, for the author’s right to disappear at the very moment at which he 
exercises it.  Perhaps referring to Lord Camden’s elevation of the author who writes only 
for glory, Lakanal contemptuously dismisses that notion, querying, “By what stroke of 
fate must it be that the man of genius, who devotes his waking hours to the instruction of 
his fellow citizens, might look forward only to a sterile glory, and might not claim the 
legitimate tribute of such noble work?”98 
 
 We can see that revolutionary rhetoric deliberately paired the author’s domain 
with the advancement of revolutionary ideals.  Authors deserve exclusive rights not only 
because they bring forth the products of “genius,” but particularly because that genius 
bears a strongly republican stamp.  But the concept of “propriété publique” was also a 
revolutionary rallying cry.  It instituted what Professor Carla Hesse has called “a ‘public 
domain’ of democratic access to a common cultural inheritance.”99  The concept lingers 
in the text of the laws, particularly regarding the role of formalities.  The 1792 law 
amending the public performance right conditioned the vesting of the right on compliance 
with a notice-giving obligation.100  The 1793 law conferring reproduction rights imposed 
a requirement of deposit of copies with the national library.101  It is difficult to discern 
from the sparse caselaw addressing formalities whether French courts perceived them as 
conditions precedent to acquiring rights, or instead as means of perfecting pre-existing 
rights necessary to initiate an infringement action,102 or yet instead as a condition 
subsequent whose non fulfillment would divest the author of the copyright he initially 
                                                 
95 Law of July 19-24, 1793. 
96 Report of François Hell, Archives parlementaires, 28 September 1791, p. 533, quoted in Rideau, see note 
92 above, p. 261. 
97 See Rideau p. 262, n 744. 
98 Archives parlementaires, 19 July 1793 p. 186. 
99 Carla Hesse, “Enlightenment epistemology and the laws of authorship” (1990) 30 Representations 109, 
129. 
100 Decree of 30 August, 1792, arts 4-6, Bulletin annoté des lois, décrets et ordonnances, 273 (1834). 
101 Law of 19-24 July, 1793, art. 6. 
102 See Rideau, note 92 above p. 270. 
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enjoyed.103  That the question was raised at all nonetheless indicates that the courts were 
uncertain of the boundary between the author’s domain and the public’s. 
 
By contrast, two of our other tools for separating the author’s domain from the 
public’s -- subject matter and scope of rights – delineate a capacious authorial 
exclusivity, because the 1793 act grandly extended to “écrits en tout genre” (writings of 
all kinds);104 and the combination of the 1791 and 1793 acts covered the waterfront of 
rights, which may explain why France did not supplant these texts with a more fully 
developed code until 1957.   
 
As for our fourth yard-stick, duration, we have seen that the term, while 
potentially much longer than the Statute of Anne’s, was unambiguously terminal.  The 
Statute of Anne provided for 14 years from publication, “and no longer”105 unless the 
author was still living at the end of that time, in which case another 14 years attached.106  
But until Donaldson, it was vigorously argued that the cutoff applied only to the special 
statutory remedies, not to the existence of the property right itself.107  In France, because 
the positive law was clear, the advocates of perpetual copyright pressed their case before 
the legislature.  The period from the decree of 1 Germinal year XIII (1804) creating 
exclusive rights in posthumously published works, to the law of 1866 setting the term of 
copyright at life + 50 (where it largely remained until the EU Duration Directive of 1993 
added another 20 years) saw increasingly acrimonious debates over the nature of 
copyright.108  Perpetualists argued that authors’ rights were property, and property rights 
must, by their nature, endure forever.109  Their antagonists, whom I’ll dub public 
domainists, emphasized that the rights contended-for were by their nature incorporeal and 
                                                 
103 See Judgment of Oct. 23, 1806, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Recueil Général des Lois et des Arrêts, [Dev. & 
Car.] 1.299; Judgment of Nov. 26, 1828, Cour royale, Paris, [1828] 9 Dev. & Car. 2.159.   Both of these 
held that deposit of copies, rather than simply meeting a procedural requirement, gave rise to the copyright.   
In Judgment of Mar. 1, 1834, Cass. crim., 1834 Dev. & Car. 1.65, the Cour de cassation states that the 1793 
law "guarantees literary property, upon condition of deposit of two copies with the Bibliothèque nationale" 
and refers to the "loss of that property right through failure of deposit."  Id. at 75.  As a result of this 
decision, the question whether deposit under the 1793 law created, perfected, or merely served to prove, the 
copyright became moot: the court held that subsequent enactments (in 1810, 1814, and 1828) had 
substituted a different deposit requirement for that set forth in article 6 of the 1793 law.  See also Judgment 
of Jan. 20, 1818, Cass. crim., 52 J. Pal. 5, considering compliance with formalities as giving rise to 
exclusive rights.  The court states the plaintiffs "published the work in 1816 and fulfilled all the formalities 
prescribed for acquiring the exclusive right to sell."  Id. pp. 12-13.  Plaintiff's advocate made the same 
assumption when he contended that a French national first publishing abroad could nonetheless obtain 
copyright protection in France by completing the formalities to which the privilege is subject.  Id. p. 8. 
104 Law of 19-24 July, 1793, art. 1. 
105 8 Anne c 19 section 1. 
106 Id secction 9. 
107 See, e.g., Millar v Taylor, [1769] 4 Burr 2303; 98 Eng. Rep. 201; Tonson v. Collins, [1761] 1 Black W 
321; 96 Eng. Rep. 180. 
108 For a collection of the reports accompanying the various bills and rehearsing the arguments, see Fernand 
Worms, Etude de la propriété littéraire 2 vols. (Paris 1878). 
109 See, e.g, Edouard Laboulaye, La propriété littéraire au XVIIIème siècle (Paris 1859) pp. 18-9 (literary 
property is the same as other real property, and the author’s right in it is a « droit perpétuel dans son 
principe »); J-B Jobard, Organon de la Propriété Intellectuelle (Paris 1851) pp. 54-55, 269. 
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therefore incapable of ownership.110  A copyright thus could only be a contract between 
the author and society, in which the author received a limited term of exclusivity in 
recompense for his contributions to society.  Joseph Prudhon, of notorious hostility to 
property in general, thundered against one of the draft perpetual copyright bills: 
 
By enacting such a law, the legislature will have done far worse than paying the 
author an exorbitant price, it will have abandoned the principle of the chose 
publique, of the intellectual domain, and at great harm to the community.  …  Let 
us not disinherit humanity of its domain . . . Intellectual property does not merely 
encroach on the public domain; it cheats the public of its share in the production 
of all ideas and all expressions.111 
 
 The Conseiller d’Etat Riché, reporting on the 1866 law, also emphasized the 
communal features of works of authorship, echoing Le Chapelier: 
 
[Upon publication] the work is given over to the public; the author’s property 
becomes a thing in common to all who encounter it . . . It is no longer the property 
of its producer, this thing which grows and multiplies the further it goes from its 
producer.  In the nature of things there is no literary property right in a work once 
it has been given over to the public.  The nature of things has created the opposite 
of property, it has created a divestiture.112 
 
As Professor Laurent Pfister has observed, a great deal of nineteenth-century French 
copyright (or anti copyright) rhetoric sounds a lot like today’s cyber-libertarian 
“copyleft” avant la lettre.113  But Riché, while denigrating the concept of literary 
property nonetheless urged adoption of a law which, albeit not perpetual, installed one of 
the longest copyright terms in the world.  This is one of the paradoxes of nineteenth-
century French copyright before the advent of moral rights: much of the rhetoric sought 
as a matter of principle to diminish the moral claims of author’s rights by situating them 
in a broader landscape of the public interest.  But in practice the positive law was 




                                                 
110 See, e.g., Augustin-Charles Renouard, Traité des droits des auteurs (Paris 1838) p. 203 (« Le droit au 
privilège est le prix du travail; c’est une rémunération dont la loi garantit la jouissance exclusive comme 
prix d’échange et dette de reconnaissance par lesquels la société paie l’utilité et le plaisir qu’elle retire de 
l’ouvrage.  Il dérive de la qualité d’auteur. ») ; Edouard Calmels, De la Propriété et de la contrefaçon des 
œuvres de l’intelligence (Paris 1856) pp. 33-34; Paul Clément, Etude sur le droit des auteurs (Grenoble 
1867) pp. 72-79 (doctoral dissertation with extensive demonstration of how post-publication rights cannot 
fit usus, fructus, abusus characteristics of  civil law property). 
111 Joseph Prudhon, « Les Majorats Littéraires : Examen d’un projet de loi ayant pur but de créer, au profit 
des auteurs, inventeurs et artistes, un monopole perpétuel » (1862), in Jan Baetens (ed.), Le Combat du 
droit d’auteur (Paris 2001) pp. 140,152-53. 
112 In Worms, see note 7 above, pp. 228, 244, 249. 
113 Laurent Pfister, « La propriété littéraire est-elle une propriété? Controverses sur la nature du droit 
d’auteur au XIXe siècle » (July 2005) 205 RIDA 117, 117-19. 
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 We come, at last, to the United States.  In the first flush of freedom from England, 
the Continental Congress at Noah Webster’s urging (not to say pestering),114 in turn 
urged the States to enact copyright laws to promote the production of instructive works of 
authorship.  The pre-Constitutional copyright statutes revealed multiple motivations, 
mixing Statute of Annesque encouragements of learned men to write useful books with 
strong affirmations of authors’ labor-based natural property rights.115  The Constitutional 
copyright clause also melds public domain and authorial property rationales.  It 
empowers Congress “to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and discoveries.”116  The goal of the property right is to enhance public knowledge, but 
the rights – though limited in time -- are “secure[d],” not “granted,” by Congress.  As we 
shall see, the Supreme Court in 1834 declined to read “secured” to advert to a concurrent 
common law property right regime, and held instead that rights in published works were 
a purely statutory creation.117  But in 1787, when the clause was drafted, selection of the 
term “secured” may have meant that the Framers understood copyright to have been a 
natural right pre-existing at common law.118  At least, Madison in Federalist 43 prompts 
that conclusion, for, in justifying the power granted to Congress to provide for copyright 
and patents, he asserts that “The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in 
Great Britain to be a right of common law.”119 
 
 If the starting point for federal copyright seemed to assume the author’s pre-
existing property rights120, the first statutes, enacted in 1790 for maps, charts and 
books,121 and in 1802 for prints and engravings,122 prompt a different conclusion.  The 
statutes were heavily inspired by (not to say largely plagiarized from) the Statute of Anne 
and Hogarth’s Act.  But the formalities imposed were more burdensome than their 
                                                 
114 See Noah Webster, Origin of the Copy-Right Laws in the United States, in A Collection of Papers on 
Political, Literary and Moral Subjects (N.Y. 1843 & B. Franklin ed. photo. reprint 1968). 
115 The statutes are collected in Thorvald Solberg, (ed.), Copyright Enactments of the United States: 1783– 
1906 Copyright Office Bulletin No. 3, 2nd ed., rev., (Washington 1963)  pp.1-21.  See also, Francine 
Crawford, “Pre-Constitutional Copyright Statutes” (1975) 23 Bull. Copyr. Soc. 11.  See particularly the 
statutes of Massachusetts and Connecticut .  But see Alfed C. Yen, “Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright 
as Labor and Possession” (1990) 51 Ohio St. L. J. 517, 530-1 (early decisions indicate that courts perceived 
these statutes to express primarily economic motivations). 
116 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8 cl. 8. 
117 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 US 591 (1834). 
118 For a review of various meanings to ascribe to “securing,” see, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, “Inherent 
or Created Rights: Early Views on the Intellectual Property Clause” (1995)15 Hamline L. Rev. 81, 92-98  
(inter alia, the Preamble to the US Constitution states that one of the purposes of the constitution is to 
“secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity”; the Constitution didn’t grant liberty – the 
war of Independence did that – but it was designed to protect and reinforce it).  See also Edward C. 
Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective (Buffalo 
2002) pp. 210-12. 
119 The Federalist Papers, No 43 (Madison) (Modern Library ed. 1937 at 279).  
120 But cf. Hyde, see note 20 above, pp. 18-27 (contending that the Framers conceived of copyright within 
the British land-ownership metaphors, but added a civic republican gloss which prompted them to think of 
intellectual (and of real) property as conferred for use for the public good).     
121 1790 Act, §§ 3 and 4. 
122 1802 Act, § 1. 
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English counterparts.123  More importantly, where the English statutes and their early 
judicial interpretations confined formalities to specific statutory remedies,124 the US 
statutes conditioned the existence and enforceability of the right on compliance with the 
registration and deposit formalities.  If there was any ambiguity regarding the availability 
of general common law remedies for violations of the 1790 Act in the absence of 
compliance with formalities, the 1802 Act, which added the notice formality and imposed 
it on 1790 Act works, left no doubt that the work would never attain federal protection if 
the formalities went unfulfilled.125  Formalities proved so essential to US copyright that 
one federal court, endeavoring in 1829 to determine whether a “daily price quote” could 
qualify for copyright, concluded that ephemera of this kind, whose utility and value 
vanish after a day, could not be copyrightable subject matter within the statute because 
they could not comply with formalities directing the proprietor to publish a record of the 
work’s publication for four weeks in one or more newspapers, and to deposit the work 
within six months of publication.126 
 
 Apart from that decision, there appears to be no early caselaw addressing what 
subject matter came within the statutory categories of “any map, chart or book” or “prints 
and engravings.”  But a review of early copyright registration records suggests that 
                                                 
123 The 1790 Act required deposit of the work with the clerk of the federal district court upon publication of 
the work (§3), and deposit of 3 copies with the Secretary of State within 6 months of publication (§ 4). The 
1802 act further required of a notice of copyright in at least one newspaper within one month of publication 
(§1).   
124 See discussion above. 
125 Justice Bushrod Washington so held in Ewer v. Coxe, 8 F. Cas. 917 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1824).  Accord, 
Nichols v Ruggles, 3 Day 145 (Ct. 1808).  But see King v Force, 14 F. Cas. 521 (C.C.D. D.C. 1820) 
(suggesting the plaintiff could cure the omission of the date from his map by republishing the map with the 
date). 
126 Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1829).   
 Republican fears of monopolies may have motivated the institution and judicial requirement of 
strict observance of statutory formalities.  See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce, “Copyright in 1791: 
An Essay Concerning the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article 1, 
Section 8 Clause 8 of the Constitution” (2003) 52 Emory L.J. 909, 941.  On intellectual property and early 
American monopoly-phobia, see, e.g., Hyde, note 20 above pp. 13-29; Paul J. Heald and Suzanna Sherry, 
“Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on 
Congress” 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1119, 1169; Yochai Benkler, “Constitutional Bounds of Database 
Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information” 
(2000) 15 Berkley Tech. L. J. 535, 570 (the founders understood copyright as a monopoly to be “carefully 
circumscribed”).  But see Tom Nachbar, “Constructing Copyright’s Mythology” (2002) 6 Green Bag 2d. 
37, 45 (modern scholars’ attribution of anti-monopoly animus to the framing of early US copyright laws is 
overstated); Edward C. Waltersheid, “To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The 
Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution” (1994) 2 J. 
Intell. Prop. L. 1, 55-6 (noting the few voices raised against giving Congress the power to grant 
monopolies, but concluding that “Just as in the Constitutional Convention itself, the issue of the limited 
monopolies authorized by the Intellectual Property Clause seems never to have been a point of contention 
in the state ratifying conventions. Although it was generally received with favor by those who thought 
about it, with Jefferson being the notable exception, the reality is that among the much more momentous 
issues addressed with respect to the new Constitution, very few actually gave much thought to it.”); Paul 
M. Schwartz, William Michael Treanor, “Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual 
Property as Constitutional Property” (2003) 112 Yale L.J. 2331, 2364, 2384-5 (originalist arguments do not 
withstand careful examination, which reveals a spectrum of attitudes including support for monopolies 
among the Federalists and – in a limited manner – from the future Republicans). 
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“book” was broadly understood to encompass dramatic and musical works.  Thus, of 263 
registrations made with the federal district court in Pennsylvania between 1790 and 1800, 
2 were for plays, and 12 were for a variety of musical works, including a single song, and 
a collection of republican songs.  During the same period in Massachusetts, of 198 
registrations, two were for plays and 16 for musical works, of which 11 were hymnals.  
By contrast, in more worldly New York, with a total of 103 registrations, 5 of the 
registrations were for musical works, only one of them was a hymnal, the others were 
operas and dance music, along with 3 plays.127 
 
With respect to rights protected, the general US approach was highly positivistic.  
Congress, not the courts, established and expanded the scope of copyright.  Stowe v 
Thomas128 is a notable example.  Harriet Beecher Stowe complained of the unauthorized 
translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin.  But the statute then afforded rights only to print, 
publish and vend.  The court characterized statutory copyright as a derogation from the 
public domain.  It ruled that once Stowe’s work was published it “bec[a]me as much 
public property as [the creations] of Homer or Cervantes.”  Only those rights specified by 
the statute survived the dedication to the public that publication effected.  According to 
the court, a translation might be a copy of Stowe’s “thoughts or conceptions, but in no 
correct sense can it be called a copy of her book.”129   
 
 The legal positivism characterizing Stowe and similar decisions received fullest 
expression in Wheaton v Peters, which is sometimes called the US counterpart to 
Donaldson, because the Supreme Court there rejected common law copyright.130  The 
dispute, however, concerned compliance with formalities, not expiration of the statutory 
term, (over which there seems to have been no dispute). 131  The US high court’s denial of 
common law rights was far clearer and more sweeping than the Peers’.  Henry Wheaton 
had been the reporter of the decisions of the Supreme Court.  Upon his retirement from 
that post, his successor Richard Peters not only published new volumes covering new 
decisions of the Court, but also reissued Wheaton’s reports, without Wheaton’s 
commentaries.  Today, the decision is remembered principally for its holding, almost in 
passing in the last sentence of a lengthy majority opinion, that “the court are unanimously 
of the opinion that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions 
                                                 
127 See Federal Copyright Records, 1790-1800 (James Gilreath, ed. 1987). 
128 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1853). 
129 Id p. 208. 
130 See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce, “Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’ 
View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article 1, Section 8 Clause 8 of the Constitution” 
(2003) 52 Emory L.J. 909, 928 n 45; Howard B. Abrams, see note 71 above, p. 1178. 
131 There seems not to have been much if any agitation in the US in favor of perpetual post publication 
copyright, perhaps because the US, in contrast to England, did not have a printer-booksellers’ monopoly.  
See Tom Nachbar, “Constructing Copyright’s Mythology” (2002) 6 Green Bag 2d. 37, 45 (US publishers 
in fact were hostile to long copyright terms).  Curtis’ 1847 treatise on copyright, the first of its kind in the 
US, does not take issue with the limited duration of US copyright.  On the contrary, he deems it desirable 
for both practical reasons (the dissipation of the right across successive generations of heirs), and policy 
considerations (quid pro quo). See George Ticknor Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Copyright (Boston 
1847) pp. 23-25. 
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delivered by this court. . .”132  Most of the opinions and the arguments of counsel, 
however, addressed the legal foundation of authors’ exclusive rights.   
 
Wheaton’s claim encountered the objection that he had no federal statutory rights 
because he had failed to comply with the multiple formalities imposed by the 1790 and 
1802 statutes.  Although insisting he had acquitted himself of those obligations, Wheaton 
also rejoined that if his statutory copyright claim failed, he nonetheless enjoyed 
enforceable common law rights.  A 3-2 majority of the court followed Peters’ argument 
that, whatever the state of affairs in England, in the US, copyright was purely statutory.  
The court determined that there was no federal common law,133 and, as to the States, 
before Independence, Pennsylvania, where Wheaton’s reports had first been published 
and registered, had no common law of copyright in published works.  As a result, 
copyright was a statutory creature from the start.  The State copyright statutes of the pre-
Constitutional period having been supplanted by the federal statute, it was solely to the 
1790 and 1802 enactments that Wheaton must look for his post-publication rights.  
Congress having created the right, compliance with every jot and tittle of statutory 
formalities was essential to its vesting and enforceability. 
 
Wheaton had tried to support his claim of common law rights by stressing that the 
Constitutional copyright clause and the 1790 Act “secured” the exclusive rights of 
authors, rather than “vesting” them, as had the Statute of Anne.  The latter suggests a new 
grant, while the former evokes a confirmation of prior rights.  If the constitution gave 
Congress the power to “secure” authors’ rights, the argument went, that must imply that 
the rights pre-existed the constitution.  Congress would be reinforcing, rather than 
creating exclusive rights in the writings of authors.  Wheaton’s counsel asserted:  “Had 
the convention designed to take away, or to authorize congress to take away the common 
law property, they would have used the words vest, or grant; and would have carefully 
avoided the word secure.”134 
 
The majority made short work of this contention.  It observed that the 
constitutional clause employs “securing” with respect to both the writings of authors and 
the discoveries of inventors.  Yet it is clear that patents were not protected at common 
law.  The word cannot, the majority insisted, at once mean pre-existing rights for 
copyright and newly created rights for patents.  If the word is to have the same meaning 
for both, then it can only mean a new grant.135  The drafting history of the patent-
                                                 
132 33 US p. 668.  For a general examination of Wheaton, see Craig Joyce, “The Story of Wheaton v. 
Peters:  A Curious Chapter in the History of Judicature” in IP Stories, see note 56 above, p. 36. 
133 33 US p. 658. 
134 1834 US LEXIS 619 p. *** 73. 
135 Id p. 661. 
The district court disposed of the “securing” argument in the following terms: “As I have mentioned the 
state statutes on this subject, I should notice an argument much pressed from the use in them of the word 
securing and not vesting the right. This is too slender a foundation to raise an acknowledged, pre-existing 
right upon. The same term is used in the act of congress of 1790, but was it an acknowledgement by 
congress that the United States, as such, had a common law which vested the right, and that they passed 
their law only to secure it?”  Opinion of Judge Hopkinson, Appendix II to Wheaton v Peters, 1834 U.S. 
LEXIS 619, p. ***51. 
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copyright clause, however, suggests that this reading was not in fact inevitable: the 
copyright and patent parts had originally been proposed separately and were merged into 
one clause, perhaps without full consideration of how the gerund would distribute across 
the now-combined indirect objects.136  But the Wheaton court’s awareness or ignorance 
of this history does not matter.  In 1834, any argument built on “securing” was doomed to 
fail, for reasons extraneous to competing conceptions of the author’s and the public’s 
domains. 
 
The reasons go back to 1798, when the New York legislature granted Robert 
Livingston “the sole right and advantage of making and employing the steam boat” for a 
term of 20 years provided that Livingston within a year’s time demonstrate that he had in 
fact built a steamboat.137  Livingston teamed up with Robert Fulton, but, unable to meet 
the deadline, they succeeded in obtaining successive extensions of the monopoly.  In 
April 1808, they launched a 20-ton steamboat capable of going up river on the Hudson at 
the stately speed of four miles an hour.  Whereupon the New York legislature granted 
them another five years’ exclusivity, with the possibility of further grants to a total of 30 
years.  The New York courts routinely enforced these monopolies.138  Students of 
American constitutional law will recognize the facts underlying one of the Marshall 
court’s signal federalism decisions, Gibbons v. Ogden,139 from 1824. The Supreme Court 
there held that New York’s monopolies on steamboat ferry service on the Hudson 
conflicted with Congress’ constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce.  Gibbons 
v Ogden thus is celebrated as one of the cornerstones of federal power;140 its relationship 
to intellectual property and its foreshadowing of Wheaton v Peters, seems to have passed 
unobserved. 
 
Counsel in Gibbons and in earlier New York cases involving the steamboat 
monopoly devoted much of their argument to New York’s power to confer patents for 
inventions, a power asserted to be concurrent with the federal Congress’ powers under 
the patent-copyright clause.  In broad outline, the argument went as follows.  The 
Constitution provides for Congress’ power to “secure” the exclusive rights of authors and 
inventors.  The term “securing” implies pre-existing rights. Copyright is such a right, as it 
has been recognized as a right at common law.  Madison in Federalist 43 adverted to this 
                                                 
136 See Bugbee, see note 12 above, p. 126 (Madison’s record of the proposals before the Convention set out 
a list drawn up by Madison including the following: “To secure to literary authors their copyrights for a 
limited time” and “To encourage by premiums & provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and 
discoveries”; and a list by Charles Pinckney including “To grant patents for useful inventions” and “To 
secure to Authors exclusive rights, for a . . . certain time.”)  For a detailed exploration of the drafting 
history of the patent-copyright clause, see Dotan Oliar, “The Immediate Origins of the Intellectual Property 
Clause” (2006)(on file with the author). 
137 The facts of the steamboat controversy are taken from Livingston v. van Ingen, 9 Johns 507 (NY Sup. 
1812).   See also IV Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall (Boston 1919) pp. 397-460. 
138 See Livingston v. van Ingen, 9 Johns 507 (NY Sup. 1812); Livingston v. Ogden, 4 Johns. Ch. Rep. 48 
(NY 1819).  Livingston v. Tompkins, Id. 415 (NY 1820). Ogden v. Gibbons, Id. 150, 174 (NY 1819). North 
River Steam Boat Co. v. Hoffman, 5 Johns. Ch. Rep. 300 (NY 1821). 
139 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
140 See e.g., IV Beveridge, above, p. 447 (“It is not immoderate to say that no other judicial pronouncement 
in history was . . . so interwoven with the economic and social evolution of a nation and a people, After 
almost a century, Marshall’s Nationalist theory of commerce is more potent than ever . . .”)  
 26
and further urged that inventions ought for the same labor-rewarding reasons also to 
come within Congress’ power to regulate through a patent system.  Thus, even though 
historically there was no common law patent, nonetheless the logic supporting common 
law copyright ought to apply to patents as well.  In other words, there should be residual 
authority to recognize patents at common law.  But, in the absence of federal common 
law, the relevant source of law will be the common law of the several States.  Nothing in 
the constitutional clause suggests that the grant of authority to Congress was intended to 
displace the States’ pre-existing rights.  Therefore the States enjoy and retain the power 
to grant patent rights.141   
 
The steamboat monopolists thus built from the foundation of “securing” an 
elaborate construct whose practical effect would have eviscerated federal power.  New 
York’s steamboat monopolies were creating precisely the kinds of barriers to interstate 
trade that had hobbled the new nation under the Articles of Confederation – and that had 
occasioned the adoption of the federal constitution in the first place.142  The monopolies 
conflicted with federal legislation governing navigation, a prerogative Congress enjoyed 
by virtue of its power to regulate commerce among the several States.  Justice Marshall’s 
opinion gives only the slightest hint of the roiling patent power controversy: 
As this [analysis of the commerce power] decides the cause, it is unnecessary to 
enter in an examination of that part of the constitution which empowers Congress 
to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.143 
 
 The relevance of Gibbons v Ogden to our exploration of the respective domains of 
author and public in early US copyright, I suggest, is to have taken “securing” out of 
contention as a basis for non statutory authors’ rights pre-existing and concurrent with the 
federal statute.  “Securing” had become a by-word for States’ rights, for national sub-
units’ exercise of an economic regulatory power which could undermine the larger nation 
state.  If “securing” meant that the States not only previously had but concurrently 
enjoyed power to protect published works, the pairing of patent and copyright in the 
constitutional clause could mean that States also retained that power with respect to 
inventions.  Whatever the deleterious effect on interstate commerce from State regulation 
of works of authorship, the impact stemming from competing state regulation of 
inventions was both apparent and unacceptable. 
 
 It is unlikely that Madison’s reference in Federalist 43 to common law copyright 
was intended to encourage such a result.  Indeed, Madison’s remark in the same dispatch 
that the States “cannot separately make effectual provision” for the rights of authors and 
                                                 
141 See, e.g., in Gibbons, 1824 LEXIS US pp. ***61-66; ***177-82 (petitioner); Livingston v. van Ingen, 
Emmet for Petitioners (“Congress have not power to confer a boon or reward. Its power is merely to secure 
a right for a limited time. . . .  The state grants and creates an estate, and rewards the inventor. The patent 
merely secures the property to the inventor for a certain time. It proceeds as to authors, on the common law 
notion; as to inventors, on natural rights.”) 
142 See, e.g., Federalist 22 (Hamilton) (defect of system under Articles of Confederation is absence of 
national power to regulate commerce, and consequent “interfering and unneighborly regulations of some 
States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union”). 
143 22 US p. 239. 
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inventors144 suggests that he believed that only the federal entity could effectively ensure 
protection.145  This may not mean that he believed that the States should not be permitted 
to provide for authors and inventors, but it is doubtful that he anticipated that the States 
would compete with the federal government in making such provision.  It is more 
probable that Madison’s reference to authors’ common law rights in Britain served the 
rhetorical purpose of equating authors’ rights with the claims of natural justice.  Whether 
or not Madison thought through the consequences of an enforceable common law right in 
the United States, in the absence of federal common law, implementing State common 
law rights in published works in the American system would have created an intractable 
federalism problem.   
 
I do not wish to leave you with the impression that, after Wheaton, there was no 
common law copyright in the US, and that, accordingly, the author’s domain was strictly 
limited to the narrow realm of the federal statutes.  The public domain began with 
publication.  An unpublished work, as a chattel, remained the object of common law 
rights, and this was still true until 1978.146  Over time, moreover, US courts elaborated a 
parallel universe of common law rights in works which, albeit technically “unpublished” 
because they had not been distributed in copies to the general public, had nonetheless 
encountered significant, indeed sometimes massive public exposure.147  Borrowing from 
old English decisions holding that a public performance was not a “publication,”148 US 
courts created a common law right of public performance.149  Thus, notwithstanding 
Congress’ addition, in 1856, of a public performance right to statutory copyright,150 a 
playwright could invoke common law rights to prevent a rival theater from producing his 
play so long as the original remained unpublished.  And, because it was not a 
“publication,” the public delivery of a lecture before enormous crowds would not forfeit 
the author’s common law right to determine whether and when to distribute the work in 
copies thereafter.  The rather strained notion of publication was motivated in large part by 
courts’ awareness that, were the work to be deemed “published,” and had the author not 
                                                 
144 Federalist 43, above. 
145 See also Madison, “Observations by JM [on the weaknesses of the Confederation]” (“Instances of 
inferior moment are the want of uniformity in the laws concerning naturalization and literary property”), 
quoted in Bruce Bugbee, The Genesis of American Patent and Copyright Law (Washington 1967) p. 125. 
146 The 1976 copyright act abolished the publication threshold for entitlement to federal copyright, which 
now “subsists” as of the creation and fixation of the work, see 17 USC § 102(a). 
147 See, e.g., Estate of Martin Luther King v. CBS, 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999) (“I Have a Dream” 
speech technically “unpublished” despite delivery before live audience of thousands, and television and 
radio broadcast to millions); see generally, William S. Strauss, Study No. 29 “Protection of Unpublished 
Works,” in Studies on Copyright, Arthur Fisher Mem. Ed. 189 (1963). 
148 See Macklin v. Richardson, [1770] Amb 694, 27 Eng. Rep. 451; Coleman v. Walthen, [1793] 5 TR 245, 
101 Eng. Rep. 137; Morris v Kelly, [1820] 1 Jac. & W. 481, 37 Eng. Rep. 451. 
149 See, e.g., Boucicault v Fox, 3 F Cas. 977, 981 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862)(equitable remedies available for 
unauthorized performance of unpublished play); Tompkins v Halleck, 133 Mass. 32 (1882)(examining prior 
authorities and concluding that common law copyright subsists in unpublished play that has been publicly 
performed, and can be enforced both against unauthorized publication and unauthorized public 
performance). 
150 Act of August 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 138, c. 169. 
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complied with all applicable federal statutory formalities, the work would go into the 
public domain, and all protection, state or federal, would be lost.151   
 
Another area in which state common law and federal copyright diverged was the 
treatment of foreign authors.  The first US copyright statute § 5, emulating the Statute of 
Anne s 7, withheld protection from works of foreign authors first published abroad.  
Because this kind of provision remained in the US copyright law until 1891, English 
works were regularly pirated in the US.152  By contrast, unpublished works were 
protected at state common law, for reasons strongly evocative of natural rights, as an 
1872 New York decision illustrates: 
 
The right to literary property is as sacred as that to any other species of property.  
The courts of the State are open to an alien friend pursuing his property, and 
seeking to recover it from a wrong-doer, and there is nothing in any positive law, 
or in the policy of the government, which would close the door against the same 
alien friend seeking protection for the fruits of his mental labor, by restraining its 
publication against his wishes.  The protection afforded by the common law to 
literary labor is very slight at best, but such as it is, it is accorded to alien friend 
and citizen alike, and both are regarded with equal favor.153 
 
Thus, even in a system as positivist as US copyright, judges found occasion to recognize 




 It is so well established today that copyright cannot, and should not, last 
forever,154 that it may be difficult to understand the appeal of perpetual common law 
copyright in published works.  But in both Britain and especially France, demands for 
                                                 
151 See, e.g., Estate of Hemingway v Random House, 23 NY2d 341, 349 (1968) (“the courts are reluctant to 
find that an author has ‘published’ so as to lose his common-law copyright”). 
 Courts’ efforts to avoid forfeitures may also explain the somewhat tortured US caselaw relating to 
sound recordings, see Study No 29, note 147 above, pp. 202-04.  In this instance, two different forfeitures 
loom, first of the recorded musical composition, and second of the recorded performance.  Under the 1909 
Act regime, if sale of phonograms constituted “publication,” and the recorded composition had not 
previously been published with notice or registered, then the sale of the recording would cast the 
composition into the public domain.  With regard to the recorded performance, sound recordings were not 
included within federal copyright subject matter until 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971), as 
amended  by Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (federal protection for sound recordings fixed and 
published with notice on and after Feb. 15, 1972).  As a result, were pre-1972 recordings deemed 
“published,” they would have immediately gone into the public domain.  Hence the judicial rulings that the 
sale and distribution of phonograms did not “publish” the performances, which, accordingly, remained 
subject to common law copyright.  See Capitol Records v. Naxos of America, 4 N.Y.3d 540 (2005); Capitol 
Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955) 
152 See generally Catherine Seville, Books, Buccaneers and the Black Flag in the Nineteenth Century 
(forthcoming 2006). 
153 Palmer v. De Witt, 47 NY 532, 539 (1872). 
154 But see UK CDPA 1988 c. 48 § 301 (potentially perpetual royalty right in JM Barrie’s “Peter Pan”), 
discussed in Catherine Seville, “Peter Pan’s Rights: “To Die Will be an Awfully Big Adventure” (2003) 51 
J. Copyr. Soc. 1, 3-7.   
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perpetual copyright persisted into the 19th century.  The expression “fall into the public 
domain” evokes the devastation of a fall from grace.  Indeed, the 19th-century poet Alfred 
de Vigny amplified the sense of desolation: he evoked the expiration of copyright as 
“tomber dans le gouffre du domaine public” – to fall into the sink hole of the public 
domain.155 
 
Gallic hyperbole notwithstanding, I think perpetuity was the punchline of a 
syllogism whose first proposition may have been the most important for authors’ rights 
advocates: an author’s intellectual labor gives rise to property rights; property rights are 
perpetual; therefore the author’s right must be perpetual, too.  To question the perpetuity 
of the right may be to unravel the syllogism, and undermine its premise.  If copyright is 
not perpetual, then it cannot be property.  If it is not property, then authors’ efforts are 
denigrated; authors become uniquely disadvantaged among those who labor.156  This, to 
echo Lord Mansfield’s celebrated litany in Millar v Taylor, is not “just.”157  Finally, there 
may be more than felt justice animating the calls for an endless author’s domain; then as 
now, copyright advocates have had literary affinities, unfulfilled artistic yearnings 
reluctantly redirected toward juridical rather than creative endeavors.  Blackstone himself 
was one of these closeted copyright lawyers.158  Yielding to his Arcadian urges, he 
penned the wistful “Lawyer’s farewell to his muse,” which, in conclusion, I shall unfairly 
(but mercifully) abridge:     
 
The Lawyer’s Farewell to His Muse 
 
Written in the Year 1744 by William Blackstone 
 
As, by some tyrant’s stern command, 
A wretch forsakes his native land, 
In foreign climes condemn’d to roam 
An endless exile from his home; 
 
So I, thus doom’d from thee to part, 
Gay queen of Fancy and of Art, 
Reluctant move, with doubtful mind, 
Oft stop, and often look behind. 
      
                                                 
155 Alfred de Vigny, « De mademoiselle Sédaine et de la propriété littéraire, Lettre à messieurs les 
Députés » (1841) reprinted in Jan Baetens, (ed.), Le Combat du droit d’auteur, Anthologie historique (Paris 
2001) pp. 107, 112-13. 
156 Cf. E. Laboulaye, Etudes sur la propriété littéraire en France et en Angleterre (Paris 1858) p. xii 
(criticizing the 1793 French copyright law for making authors’ rights "of all property rights the most 
humble and the least protected"). 
157 4 Burr. pp. 2398–99; 98 Eng. Rep. pp. 252–53. 
158 Joseph Story also joins the coifed company of poètes manqués; in 1800, perhaps in youthful indiscretion 
(he was 21), he published an 83-page poem, “The Power of Solitude.”  His son seems to have deemed the 
effort worthy of obscurity, for he did not include it among Story’s posthumously published miscellaneous 
papers, see William Wetmore Story (ed.), The Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story: Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States and Dane Professor of Law at Harvard University (Boston 1852). 
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Me wrangling courts, and Stubborn Law, 
To smoak, and crowds, and cities draw; 
There selfish Faction rules the day, 
And Pride and Av’rice throng the Way: 
 
Adieu, celestial Nymph, adieu: 
Shakespear no more thy sylvan son, 
Nor all the art of Addison, 
Pope’s heav’n-strung lyre, nor Waller’s ease, 
Nor Milton’s mighty self must please: 
Instead of these, a formal band 
In furs and coifs around me stand; 
With sounds uncouth and accents dry 
That grate the soul of harmony, 
Each pedant sage unlocks his store 
Of mystic, dark, discordant lore; 
And points with tott’ring hand the ways 
That lead me to the thorny maze.  
There, in a winding, close retreat, 
Is Justice doom’d to fix her seat,  
There, fenc’d by bulwarks of the Law,  
She keeps the wond’ring world in awe, 
 
Then welcome business, welcome strife, 
Welcome the cares, the thorns of life, 
The visage wan, the pore-blind sight, 
The toil by day, the lamp at night, 
The tedious forms, the solemn prate, 
The pert dispute, the dull debate, 
The drowsy bench, the babling Hall, 
For thee, fair Justice, welcome all! 
 
 
